Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland by Perkins, Andrew R
Grand Valley Journal of History 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 1 
3-27-2018 
Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army 
of the Cumberland 
Andrew R. Perkins 
Cedarville University, aperkins@cedarville.edu 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh 
 Part of the Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Perkins, Andrew R. (2018) "Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the 
Cumberland," Grand Valley Journal of History: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Grand Valley Journal of History by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please 
contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu. 
Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the 
Cumberland 
Cover Page Footnote 
CEDARVILLE UNIVERSITY “NOT WRITTEN IN LETTERS OF BLOOD”: THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF THE 
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE GRAND VALLEY JOURNAL OF 
HISTORY BY ANDREW R.E. PERKINS 19 JANUARY 2017 
This article is available in Grand Valley Journal of History: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1 
 
 
There is a chapter missing in the annals of Civil War history. The story of an 
entire army, and the thousands of men that comprised it, is being widely 
overlooked by the majority of Civil War historians. That army, the Union Army 
of the Cumberland, has begun to fade into public obscurity due to four main 
factors: poorly timed defeats and victories in battle, personal feuds and politicking 
between Union officers, the mistakes of the army’s commanders, and the undue 
emphasis of Civil War historians on Southern romanticism.  
The Two Armies: Potomac and Cumberland 
 While the largest Union army of the war, the Army of the Potomac, has 
numerous publications lining the shelves of libraries around the country, the 
second largest army, the Army of the Cumberland, has garnered no such attention. 
For proof, look no further than texts written about the Battle of Gettysburg (in 
which the Army of the Potomac took part), which make up approximately half of 
the 65,000 books about the Civil War.1 This is relatively unsurprising, as 
Gettysburg does represent perhaps the Union’s finest victory of the war, on its 
bloodiest battlefield. However, by comparison, the Battle of Stones River, one of 
the more notable battles in which the Army of the Cumberland took part, has 
received just four full volumes written about it,2 despite being a significant Union 
                                                          
1 Alexander Atkins, “Gettysburg by the Numbers” Atkinsbookshelf.com. 
2 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), ix. 
Larry J. Daniel. wrote a book on the battle later, and his book is added to Cozzens’ figure. 
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victory with the highest casualty percentage of the entire war.3 To uncover why 
the Army of the Potomac has been studied so thoroughly while the Army of the 
Cumberland has not, both armies need to be examined through their leadership, 
battles fought, and the soldiers themselves. 
 The Army of the Potomac lacked respectable leadership for the first half 
of the war. While its founder, George B. McClellan, was organizationally 
brilliant, he failed miserably during his Peninsular Campaign and barely gained 
success at Antietam. Following his failure to pursue Lee after the Maryland 
Campaign, Lincoln began a practice he would be forced to implement far too 
many times for this army; he removed McClellan from command. His successor, 
Ambrose Burnside, fared no better, displaying his incompetence through a 
horrible mauling at the Battle of Fredericksburg. In his footsteps came Joseph 
Hooker, who was trounced almost as badly at the Battle of Chancellorsville. 
Finally George Meade, the fourth and final commander of the Army of the 
Potomac, won at Gettysburg and proved himself worthy of command even after 
Ulysses S. Grant came east to supervise the army in 1864.4  
 The performance of the soldiers was generally better than their 
commanders. Though some of the men did wilt away in lopsided battles like 
                                                          
3 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 582. 
4 William Swinton, Army of the Potomac, 227, 253-54, 303-07, 410-11. 
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Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville, most of the time they performed 
admirably, such as when they made assault after assault on Marye’s Heights at 
Fredericksburg or the Sunken Road at Antietam. Units earned nicknames like 
“The Fighting 69th”5 and the “Iron Brigade.”6 The grit and determination of these 
kinds of men showed that their own commanders did not deserve them, nor did 
those soldiers deserve the defeats their officers so graciously handed to them time 
after time. 
 The Army of the Cumberland did not struggle quite as badly when it came 
to commanders. While the army was still referred to as the Army of the Ohio, it 
was commanded by Don Carlos Buell. While Buell was not a particularly brilliant 
man, he did come to Grant’s aid and help save the Battle of Shiloh for the Union,7 
and he managed to turn Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee 
out of Kentucky, despite his poor handling of the Battle of Perryville.8 After Buell 
was replaced because of that tactical loss, the army found its second commander, 
who would bring the soldiers together into a fully functioning and successful 
military unit. That commander was William Starke Rosecrans. He led the Army 
of the Cumberland to victory at Stones River and Tullahoma, before being 
soundly defeated at the Battle of Chickamauga. After Chickamauga, Grant 
                                                          
5 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) xii. 
6 McPherson, Battle Cry, 528. 
7 Daniel, Days, 84. 
8 McPherson, Battle Cry, 520-22. 
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replaced Rosecrans with George Thomas, a tough, stoic Virginian who led the 
army to even greater victories at Missionary Ridge, Atlanta, Franklin, and 
Nashville. All totaled, the Army of the Cumberland earned more victories and less 
defeats than the Army of the Potomac by a wide margin.9 
 This was due at least in part to the gallantry and valor of the 
Cumberlanders themselves, whose fighting performance on an individual basis 
was similar to their Eastern counterparts. Still, the two armies were more different 
than alike. One of the differences between the two was that the Army of the 
Cumberland had a distinctly Western flavor. While the Army of the Potomac was 
made up of genteel Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and East Coasters who had 
worked in shops and on fishing boats, the Army of the Cumberland was 
comprised of rough and tumble farmers and woodsmen from Ohio, Indiana, 
Michigan, and Illinois.10 When Eastern Confederate troops under James 
Longstreet joined their Western comrades in 1863, they were warned that: 
Them fellers out thar you ar goin’ up again, ain’t none of the blue-bellied, 
white-livered Yanks an’ sassidge-eatin’ forrin hirelin’s you have in 
                                                          
9 The Army of the Potomac won three clear victories: Antietam, Gettysburg and Petersburg 
(though Grant’s Overland Campaign of 1864 was a strategic victory, the battles that made up that 
campaign were tactically inconclusive). In contrast, they were defeated during the Peninsula 
Campaign, at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and large groups of which participated in 
losses at Bull Run, Second Bull Run, and the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. The Cumberlanders, 
on the other hand, found victory at Shiloh, Stones River, Tullahoma, Chattanooga, Atlanta, 
Franklin, Nashville, and the March to the Sea, while losing only the Battle of Chickamauga and 
fighting to a draw at Perryville. 
10 Daniel, Days, xii, 3. 
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Virginny that’ll run at the snap of a cap—they are Western fellers, an’ 
they’ll mighty quick give you a bellyful o’ fightin’.11  
 
While officers in the Army of the Potomac like McClellan believed in a 
high degree of pomp and circumstance, Western commanders like Buell, 
Rosecrans, and Thomas had no time for such triviality.12 As the men in the Army 
of the Potomac favored small, fashionable French caps called kepis, many 
Westerners wore large-brimmed slouch hats to keep the sun off of their necks and 
out of their faces.13 Overall, it could be said that the Army of the Cumberland was 
somewhat more casual than their Eastern counterparts. However, certainly the 
biggest difference between the two was 
that the Cumberlanders found more 
success in battle and had better leadership 
than their peers in the hard-luck Army of 
the Potomac.  
 This leads to an intriguing 
dilemma: If the soldiers of both armies were largely equal in fighting skill and 
performance in battle, and the Army of the Cumberland was largely more 
                                                          
11 Peter Cozzens, This Terrible Sound: the Battle of Chickamauga, (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1996) 203,Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1971), 340. 
12 Rosecrans was known for munching on an unlit cigar during battle, while Thomas often fell 
asleep during war council meetings.  
13 This can be observed when comparing photographs of units from the Eastern Theater with those 
from the Western Theater, as displayed by the inset on this page. (Photo courtesy: National 
Archives). 
  
Cumberlanders atop 
Lookout Mountain 
“Potomacs” after the Battle of 
Fredericksburg  
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successful than the Army of the Potomac, why is it the latter that receives nearly 
all the attention? 
Poorly Timed Battles 
 The answer could lie in the timing of the victories and defeats of the two 
armies, coupled with the close proximity of Washington, D.C. to the Army of the 
Potomac. While the Army of the Cumberland’s (Army of the Ohio’s) first victory 
at Shiloh on April 7th, 1862 was certainly praised throughout some of the 
Northern press, it came on the heels of McClellan’s campaign on the Virginia 
Peninsula where the newspapers and politicians in Washington focused their 
attention, believing it to be the campaign to end the war.14 McClellan’s campaign 
with the newly christened Army of the Potomac was certainly destined to turn 
heads, since the effort consisted of a massive naval operation to move an entire 
army by sea to make a ground assault against the capital of the Confederacy, 
Richmond, Virginia beginning at Fort Monroe (near Norfolk). The splendor and 
enthusiasm of McClellan’s eastern troops was unparalleled in the world, 
compounded by the sheer size of the Army of the Potomac, which numbered 
upwards of 100,000 men when it stepped off the docks at Alexandria, Virginia on 
March 17th.15 McClellan himself had already gained popularity from his 
                                                          
14 McPherson, Battle Cry, 437, 454. 
15 Swinton, Potomac, 100. 
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victorious skirmishes in Western Virginia and was a small but imposing figure of 
strength in the Napoleonic vein of army commanders. His reorganization of Irvin 
McDowell’s former Northeastern Virginia Army into his own Army of the 
Potomac had Washington abuzz with excitement, and the eyes of the nation were 
on “Little Mac” up until the moment he was turned back from the gates of 
Richmond by Robert E. Lee.16  
 In contrast, the Army of the Ohio, commanded by the lackluster Don 
Carlos Buell, numbered a modest 37,000 men when it helped turn the tide against 
the Confederate Army of Mississippi at Shiloh on April 7th (though only 18,000 
were engaged in the battle).17 While the campaign’s movement did consist of an 
impressive march from Nashville to Savannah, Tennessee, and a stellar naval 
operation to bring Buell’s men to Grant’s aid in the nick of time, none of it 
compared to McClellan’s unprecedented amphibious effort with the Army of the 
Potomac. In addition, the location of the showdowns played a role in how the 
public viewed them. Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, where the Battle 
of Shiloh took place, was hardly known outside of southwestern Tennessee, while 
Richmond, McClellan’s target, had been seen as the key to winning the war for 
the Union from the very beginning.18 Thus, when news of Union victory at a 
                                                          
16 McPherson, Battle Cry, 349. 
17 Daniel, Days, 75, 83. 
18 McPherson, Battle Cry, 334. 
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small place called Shiloh reached the Northern people, initial cheer and 
enthusiasm quickly faded as their hopes that McClellan would strike the final 
blow to the heart of the Confederacy were dashed later in July. Similarly, when 
Rosecrans led the Cumberlanders to victory at Stones River, it was not enough to 
brighten the mood that had been dampened by Burnside’s disastrous defeat at 
Fredericksburg a few weeks earlier.  
The Battle of Fredericksburg began December 11th, 1862 and ended on the 
15th, just two weeks before Rosecrans would lead his men at Stones River. 
Ambrose Burnside, the newest commander of the 120,000-man Army of the 
Potomac, had thus far outmaneuvered Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern 
Virginia, numbering just under 80,000, and he hoped to pin down Lee’s forces 
outside Fredericksburg, Virginia. Though Burnside had been hesitant to accept 
command of the army a month before, since McClellan had been a close personal 
friend and he was unsure he could live up to the legacy of “Little Mac,” he had 
outpaced Lee’s army and gained the upper hand by rapidly moving his large army 
towards Richmond. However, his wagon train had moved too slowly, and the 
army could not cross the Rappahannock River and enter the town of 
Fredericksburg until weeks after he had planned, giving Lee precious time to 
fortify the heights outside of town and prepare. Instead of wisely withdrawing and 
attempting to find another path to Richmond, Burnside foolishly sent his men in 
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piecemeal to their deaths on Marye’s Heights on December 13th and paid a heavy 
cost of 12,321 men on the casualty list. Lee, on the other hand, lost only 5,309.19 
 The Battle of Fredericksburg sent shockwaves through the Northern 
public. The New York Times wrote, “The Nation will stand aghast at the terrible 
price which has been paid for its life when the realities of the battle-field of 
Fredericksburgh [sic] are spread before it.”20 As the Army of the Potomac slinked 
back towards the river it was named after, the North quickly settled into a gloom 
that cast a pall over the remaining days of 1862. 
The final day of that perplexing year for the Union, December 31st, saw 
the beginning of a vicious battle near the city of Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Out 
West, where the newspapers and Washington influence did not permeate the 
public conscious, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland awoke prepared to 
face their enemy across the field—until that enemy drove through their lines 
before their morning coffee had cooled. The opposing commanders, Braxton 
Bragg and William Rosecrans, had both planned on using diversions on their 
opponents’ left flank while driving hard into their right. Bragg’s plan called for an 
attack just an hour before Rosecrans’, however, so it was the Confederates that 
made their advance at 6 o’clock that morning.21 The right wing of the Army of the 
                                                          
19 Swinton, Potomac, 253. 
20 “The Battle of Fredericksburg,” (New York Times, 1862). 
21 Cozzens, Place to Die, 83. 
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Cumberland collapsed almost immediately, having been unprepared for heavy 
fighting. From the onset, it appeared New Year’s Eve would seal 1862 as the year 
of Confederate triumph.22 However, in the coming hours, a stalwart defense by 
Brigadier General Phil Sheridan and his troops in the center of the line, along with 
the rallying of the right wing by Rosecrans, helped turn the tide enough to stifle a 
complete victory for Bragg.23 Two days later, the Confederates attempted another 
attack, but it was met with a hail of gunfire from forty-five Union cannons and a 
devastating counterattack from several brigades of James Negley’s division.24 
Bragg decided to retreat, leaving Rosecrans to claim a surprising victory. 
When relaying to Rosecrans his gratitude at the triumph of the Army of 
the Cumberland, President Lincoln wrote, “You gave us a hard-earned victory, 
which had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived 
over.”25 He was correct. The Northern press rejoiced in the news of Rosecrans’ 
victory, painting him as the hero of the Union. For once, it seemed that the Army 
of the Cumberland’s exploits had been properly received. However, soon this 
“thin gleam of cheer”26 wore off and could no longer boost the spirits of the 
Northern people from the heartbreak of Fredericksburg. 
                                                          
22 Cozzens, Place to Die, 101. 
23 Cozzens, Place to Die, 130. 
24 Cozzens, Place to Die, 191-92. 
25 Daniel, Days, 224. 
26 McPherson, Battle Cry, 582. 
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In the summer of 1863, the Cumberlanders would be outshone once more. 
After constant prodding from the War Department in the six months following 
Stones River, Rosecrans finally left his fortifications in Murfreesboro in late June, 
brilliantly driving Bragg’s army completely out of Eastern Tennessee and into 
Georgia, capturing eighty miles of land with very few casualties.27 In addition, by 
the end of the Tullahoma Campaign (as it is now called), the Army of the 
Cumberland stood unopposed at the gates of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a key 
railroad hub for the Confederate Army. Unfortunately, this monumental campaign 
concluded on July 3, 1863, the exact same day the Battle of Gettysburg ended 
with the climactic and disastrous Pickett’s Charge, and just one day before the 
Confederate Army of Mississippi and the heavily fortified city of Vicksburg, 
Mississippi fell to Grant further west. Thus, the campaign was overlooked by the 
Northern papers in favor of those two events. However, historian Steven 
Woodworth has advanced the possibility that Rosecrans’ victory “hurt [the 
Confederacy] worse in some ways than the nearly simultaneous Battle of 
Gettysburg.”28 He adds, “[the campaign] cost the Confederacy a large swath of 
valuable territory, and with it went perhaps as many as several thousand soldiers 
who decided to give up the war and desert once their homes came within Union 
lines.” Other historians, such as Earl Hess, have praised Rosecrans’ “well-planned 
                                                          
27 McPherson, Battle Cry, 669. 
28 Steven E. Woodworth, Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West, (Westport, Conn: 
Praeger, 2008), 72. 
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and finely executed”29 strategy, which did significant damage to the morale of the 
remaining soldiers in the Confederate Army of Tennessee. 
Afterwards, when Secretary of War Edwin Stanton telegrammed 
Rosecrans proclaiming the great victories in Pennsylvania and Mississippi, and of 
an opportunity for him to strike the third and final blow to end the war, an 
appalled Rosecrans retorted, “I beg in behalf of this army that the War 
Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters 
of blood.”30 Even then, when the events themselves were unfolding, Rosecrans 
could not help but feel that the poor timing of the army’s accomplishments were 
depriving them of their share of the glory. 
 Perhaps Rosecrans was right. While it is not sound logic to decisively 
conclude that the Cumberlanders have been neglected strictly due to coincidental 
unfortunate timing, the possibility remains very real and the evidence remarkably 
supportive. The aforementioned battles show that while the Northern people did 
take notice of Rosecrans and his army, their hopes and dreams for the war still 
lived and died with the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. Still, it is most likely 
                                                          
29 Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 
186. 
30 Daniel, Days, 276. 
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that this is only one of several factors in the absence of material about the Army 
of the Cumberland.  
Quarreling Between Union Generals 
 Among the factors that have led to a misunderstanding of the Army of the 
Cumberland’s significance are the personal feuds between high-ranking Union 
officers, in particular Generals Grant, Buell, Rosecrans and Thomas. Though the 
last three maintained fairly cordial professional relationships with one another, it 
was Grant’s separate conflicts with all three individuals that helped seal the fate 
of the army they each came to command. 
The first conflict, between Grant and Buell, came right on the heels of the 
Battle of Shiloh. To understand this conflict, the battle must first be analyzed to 
locate the origin of those hard feelings. The Battle of Shiloh was almost an 
enormous Confederate victory. On April 6th, 1862, Grant’s Army of the 
Tennessee, with its back to the Tennessee River and Pittsburg Landing, had been 
driven from their tents by an unexpected early-morning attack from Albert Sidney 
Johnston’s Army of Mississippi. Grant had allowed his army to become lax, as 
evidenced by lazy troop positioning and overconfidence. While he made his 
headquarters in a mansion nine miles away from the field, his officers, refusing to 
believe that Confederate troops were anywhere nearby, situated their men in a 
way that Winston Groom states was more fit for “a peacetime army”  than one 
13
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actively campaigning in enemy territory. 31 In his own analysis of the battle, Larry 
J. Daniel added, “the most critical mistake was the lack of fortifications, for which 
neither Sherman nor Grant can escape culpability.”32 As a result, the Army of the 
Tennessee stood on its back heels by the end of the first day of battle, awaiting a 
final Confederate assault that never came. 
Perhaps the largest reason it did not was due to the timely arrival of 
Buell’s Army of the Ohio on the field beginning around 5:00 p.m. on the 6th.33 
These fresh troops, numbering 13,000 men, added size and strength to Grant’s 
force, enabling him to launch a devastating counterattack the next day, driving the 
Army of Mississippi from the field.34 Without Buell’s troops, it is unlikely that 
the counterattack could have been made, and it is quite possible that General 
Beauregard (Johnston’s replacement after he had been killed) could have forced 
Grant’s survivors into the Tennessee River if the Army of the Ohio had not 
arrived.35  
 The newspapers were not kind to Grant following the battle, as many of 
them labeled him a drunkard who had been intoxicated during the battle (a charge 
                                                          
31 Winston Groom, Shiloh, 1862, (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2012), 60.  
32 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh: the Battle that Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 132. 
33 Daniel, Shiloh, 246. 
34 Daniel, Shiloh, 265, 290-292 
35 James R. Chumney, “Don Carlos Buell and the Shiloh Campaign,” (West Tennessee Historical 
Society Papers 66, December 2012), 20. 
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that is almost certainly untrue).36 In stark contrast, the press lavished praise on 
Buell’s men, claiming, “they were, in drill and appearance, the superiors of those 
under Grant.”37 Understandably, Grant was considerably upset by this, and there 
was, as one New York reporter wrote, “much ill feeling perceptible between the 
respective commands of Generals Grant and Buell.”38 
 Grant had a similar relationship with Buell’s successor, Rosecrans. 
However, one notable difference between the two relationships is that while Grant 
and Buell had never particularly liked each other,39 Grant and Rosecrans had 
worked well together on multiple occasions and had maintained a cordial 
relationship for years prior to the Battle of Iuka. 
 That relationship began in 1839, while Grant was a student at West Point 
and Rosecrans a cadet officer. Grant had been the victim of a cruel prank 
regarding a faux night guarding duty, and Rosecrans took pity on him, sending 
him back to his quarters. Twenty-three years later, when the two met again to 
serve together in the Department of Mississippi, Grant wrote his wife that if he 
must serve under any of his subordinates he would do so “willingly” under only 
two: William Tecumseh Sherman (Grant’s closest friend) and Rosecrans. 
                                                          
36 Daniel, Shiloh, 307. 
37 Stephen D. Engle, Don Carlos Buell, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 
237. 
38 Engle, Buell, 240. 
39 Groom, Shiloh, 339. Daniel, Shiloh, 243. The origin of their dislike for each other seems 
difficult to pinpoint, though Daniel attributed it to a “less than cordial” exchange in Nashville. 
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Furthermore, Grant described Rosecrans as a “warm personal friend [and] one of 
the ablest and purest of men, both in motive and action.”40 Unfortunately, this 
friendship was shattered a few months later at the Battle of Iuka. 
 At Iuka, Grant tasked Rosecrans with defeating Sterling Price’s Army of 
the West in a complex pincer movement. Unfortunately, as Rosecrans’ column 
attacked Price, the other side of the pincer, commanded by Edward Ord, did not 
budge. The signal for Ord’s movement was supposed to be the sounds of 
Rosecrans’ guns, but Ord claimed after the battle that he had not heard the guns, 
despite being only six miles away. As a result, Ord’s column never moved 
forward, leaving Rosecrans to fight the Confederates alone.41 To his credit, 
Rosecrans singlehandedly defeated Price, driving the rebels from the field. Grant, 
though disappointed that Price had been able to get away, could find no fault in 
Rosecrans’ performance. In his initial report of the battle, he wrote, “I cannot 
speak too highly of the energy and skill displayed by General Rosecrans in the 
attack, and of the endurance of the troops under him.”42 However, this opinion 
would not last long, as the press began to turn against him once more. 
  When reports of the Battle of Iuka reached the Northern public, Grant 
was again chastised by the Northern press, this time for not sending Ord’s column 
                                                          
40 Evan C. Jones, “From Friends to Enemies.” Civil War Times 53, no. 5: 30 (2014). 
41 Peter Cozzens, Darkest Days of the War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, c. 
1997), 129-30. 
42 William Lamers, Edge of Glory, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 122-3. 
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to assist Rosecrans, and, once again, questions of Grant’s sobriety circulated in 
the papers, infuriating him. Reports from the Cincinnati Commercial and 
Cincinnati Gazette were particularly painful, since they operated mere miles from 
Grant’s birthplace in Point Pleasant and childhood home in Georgetown. In an 
unfortunate coincidence, Rosecrans was friends with the two key newspapermen 
responsible for libeling Grant at both the Commercial and the Gazette. Rumors 
circulated that Rosecrans had contacted his friends to instigate a “smear 
campaign” against Grant. When Grant insinuated this in a report to Rosecrans, it 
was the latter’s turn to be furious. He responded heatedly:  
There are no headquarters in these United States less responsible for what 
newspaper correspondents and paragraphists say of operations than 
mine…After this declaration I am forced to say that if you do not meet me 
frankly with a declaration that you are satisfied I shall consider my power 
to be useful in this department ended.43  
 
After twenty-three years of amity, it was not among the smoke and 
musketry of Iuka, but in the musty air and rattle of two Cincinnati newspapers 
that Grant and Rosecrans’ once fruitful, genial relationship withered and died. In 
later reports, Grant excluded Rosecrans from praise, later citing his “neglect” at 
not placing troops on a road blocking the Confederates’ escape. Without the 
expected reinforcements from Grant and Ord, however, Rosecrans lacked the men 
                                                          
43 Jones, “Friends”. Grant seems to have let Rosecrans’ telegram go unanswered, as a survey of the 
OR will show. It is likely that General Halleck ordered Rosecrans out of Grant’s command before 
the latter could reply. 
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and resources to capture or destroy Price’s army. Nevertheless, when writing his 
memoirs years later, Grant penned, “I was disappointed at the result of the battle 
of Iuka—but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault 
at the time.”44 
The opportunity for Grant’s revenge came a year later, when he was 
promoted to command the Division of Mississippi in October of 1863.45 The 
promotion had come just a few months after Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, the last 
Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, along with the remainder of 
John Pemberton’s Army of Mississippi. Finally, for the first time since his victory 
at Fort Donelson in early 1862, it seemed the tables had turned his way. It was his 
turn to be the hero of the Northern press, and his star rose even higher in the eyes 
of Abraham Lincoln, who had been watching him with keen interest for over a 
year. Unfortunately for Rosecrans, the Army of the Cumberland was one of the 
armies included under Grant’s command. The timing could not have been worse 
for him, as Rosecrans and his Cumberlanders had just been soundly defeated at 
the Battle of Chickamauga and forced back into Chattanooga, where the 
Confederates had cut off their supply lines, leading to widespread panic and 
starvation in the army.46 Because of this, Rosecrans knew his head could very 
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well be on the chopping block. However, Grant was given a choice by Secretary 
of War Edwin Stanton: he could either leave Rosecrans in command of the Army 
of the Cumberland or replace him with George H. Thomas, Rosecrans’ highest-
ranking subordinate. The choice had been between reconciliation and revenge. If 
Grant chose the former, the gesture of kindness Rosecrans had shown all those 
years ago at West Point would be returned, and the friendship of the two men 
could heal. If he chose the latter, Grant could rid himself of Rosecrans once and 
for all and seal the fate of their enmity. Grant chose the latter. The ax fell on 
October 19, when he relieved Rosecrans of command and replaced him with 
George Thomas.47 
Thomas differentiated greatly from Rosecrans in personality, despite their 
genial working relationship. While Rosecrans was energetic and temperamental, 
Thomas was quiet and stoic.48 Nor did Thomas have the prior history with Grant 
that Rosecrans had. Indeed, when he was promoted to command the Army of the 
Cumberland by Grant during the Chattanooga Campaign, the two men knew very 
little about each other. Nevertheless, they grew to know each other quite well as 
they began their campaign to equip and supply the besieged army. Unfortunately 
for Thomas, Grant’s aggressive style contrasted sharply with his own defensive 
preferences, and problems soon arose. The first occurred on November 7th, when 
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Grant ordered Thomas to advance on Missionary Ridge. Thomas balked, as his 
men remained ill-equipped and hungry, as the famous “Cracker Line” had only 
been open for a week.49 For weeks, the two men debated when the attack should 
take place, and whose forces would lead it. This frustrated the impatient Grant, 
who, according to Thomas’ biographer, “[perceived] Thomas to be overly 
cautious and slow.”50 
When the attack finally did take place, however, it exceeded all 
expectations. At 3:40 p.m. on November 25th, four divisions of the Army of the 
Cumberland marched towards Missionary Ridge.51 They quickly drove the 
Confederates from their positions at the base of the ridge, then, realizing their 
position was exposed, proceeded to charge up the steep ridge without orders.52 
Grant was furious. The Army of the Cumberland, which had already proven 
Grant’s favorite target for criticism,53 was now disobeying his direct orders. He 
quickly turned to Thomas, demanding to know if he had ordered them up the 
ridge. Thomas said he had not.54 Grant asked another general if he had ordered 
them forward. The general replied: “No, but when those fellows get started all 
                                                          
49 Christopher J. Einolf, George Thomas, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007) 208-9. 
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lane through the mountains around Chattanooga.  
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hell can’t stop them.”55 Grant seethed, but this time at least, the general had been 
right. The Cumberlanders took Missionary Ridge, driving off Bragg’s army. 
Unfortunately, the damage to the relationship between Grant and Thomas had 
been done, and “Grant came away from the campaign with a low opinion of 
Thomas’ generalship.”56 When Grant was promoted to Commander-in-Chief, he 
left his friend Sherman in charge of the Western armies rather than Thomas, who 
was thought by most to be the more capable and qualified of the two.57 
 What does this mean when it comes to the memory of the Army of the 
Cumberland? Unfortunately, Grant had a tendency to negate the positive 
achievements of his political enemies, and Buell, Rosecrans and Thomas all fit 
that bill.58 As Professor Frank Varney has illustrated in his book General Grant 
and the Rewriting of History, Grant’s memoirs contain harsh criticism for those 
who in his perception wronged him, and the book’s main focus is on that of 
Grant’s favorite target: William Rosecrans.59 According to Varney, historians 
have taken Grant at his word on many occasions, treating his memoirs as if they 
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are flawless. As he demonstrates, however, this is not the case as Grant 
continuously rewrote history to paint himself in a better light, while purposely 
twisting facts to condemn those he disliked. This unfortunately includes not only 
Rosecrans, but also Buell and Thomas. 
The greatest victims of these feuds have been the Cumberlanders, as the 
success of an army often depends on the success of its commander, and history 
remembers armies with successful commanders. It is unlikely that the Grande 
Armée would be remembered without Napoleon, the Carthaginians without 
Hannibal, or the Macedonians without Alexander. It is therefore important to 
determine who is to blame for the losses that the Army of the Cumberland 
suffered, the men themselves or their commanders. 
Mistakes of Command 
 Don Carlos Buell was the least competent of the Cumberland’s 
commanders, and his men regarded him as such.60 In the battle that became 
crucial to his reputation, he faltered. His first mistake was in making his 
headquarters more than two miles behind the battlefield at the Dorsey house.61 
That he was unable to ride was not entirely his fault: he was confined to bed after 
his horse had fallen on top of him the night before.62 Nevertheless, his distance 
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from the fighting only contributed to the determining factors of the battle: lack of 
communication and a breakdown of command.63 As the battle raged late in the 
afternoon of October 8th, Buell could hear only the big guns and assumed his plan 
to attack the next day was still in place. He concluded that the sounds he could 
hear were nothing but “a great waste of powder there” and ordered the firing 
stopped.64 For the next two hours, he remained in his delusion. Meanwhile, the 
troops under him found themselves in the fight of their lives back in Perryville.  
 The Confederates had not been content to wait for Buell to attack and had 
sent one brigade against the Union left, making contact around 2:10 p.m.65 Many 
of these Union troops were still green, while the members of this Confederate 
brigade had served as far back as Shiloh. Nevertheless, after just twenty minutes 
of furious fighting in and around Open Knob, the attack by these Confederate 
veterans was forced back.66 It would not be the last. Minutes later, thousands of 
gray-clad soldiers emerged from the woods, and the battle recommenced. Both 
sides poured murderous fire into one another while reinforcements moved their 
way.67 For hours, the fight raged on, as more troops were fed into the fray on the 
Union left. Union General Alexander McCook’s corps, after fighting for an hour 
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and a half, was near its breaking point.68 Buell was nowhere to be found. His lack 
of presence on the battlefield contributed greatly to the confusion of Union 
command, and the sun set on Union troops that had been slowly forced back, 
taking heavy casualties. Even after the battle, Buell still failed to recognize the 
scale of the fight.69 As a result, his days as commander of this army were 
numbered. 
Even if their commanding general had not understood the magnitude of 
the battle, the soldiers had. They also understood that it was they, not their general 
officers, who had prevented the army from falling into disaster. One officer wrote 
of the fight: “To the soldiers in the ranks is the most credit due, as the nature of 
the fight was such as to require no military science, but simply brave men.”70 The 
Army of the Ohio had no shortage of brave men. Lovell Rousseau, a Union 
general who had been in the thick of the fight, described a brigade who came to 
his relief as “a gallant body of men” who “moved directly into the fight like true 
soldiers.”71 Indeed, the majority of the soldiers who served in Buell’s army fought 
well, despite their commanders’ failure to engineer a victory. In the end, the fault 
for the tactical defeat at Perryville lay with Don Carlos Buell, not the future 
Cumberlanders.   
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William Rosecrans led many of those same men into their greatest 
challenge less than a year later. After concluding his brilliant Tullahoma 
Campaign by driving Bragg back to Chattanooga by maneuvers, he unwisely 
believed exaggerated reports that Bragg’s army would not stop short of Atlanta, 
and ordered his three corps to immediately pursue the Confederates, rather than 
regroup at Chattanooga.72 Meanwhile, a dispute broke out between Rosecrans and 
one of his divisional commanders, Thomas Wood. Wood, having received orders 
from his corps commander to reconnoiter close to Chattanooga, refused to move, 
stating that his men would be hopelessly exposed and that he would not blindly 
obey orders.73 Instead, Wood moved his division two miles to the rear of his 
position and sent Rosecrans an inflammatory message which the commanding 
general found insulting and insubordinate.74 This event would have great 
repercussions for the coming battle. 
The first day of the Battle of Chickamauga, September 19th, was 
segmented and inconclusive.75 It was the following day that would prove to be the 
deciding factor of the battle. As the fighting raged in the center of the field, 
George Thomas, commanding his XX Corps, requested an additional division to 
support him. Rosecrans obliged, and the order went to John Brannan, who 
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commanded the division connecting Thomas’ right flank to the left flank of the 
XXI Corps, under Thomas Crittenden. Though Brannan initially obeyed the order 
and moved his men out of line to help Thomas, he countermanded them shortly 
afterwards, possibly fearing a Confederate attack that would fall on the gap his 
men would have to leave in order to do so. Nevertheless, Rosecrans believed 
Brannan’s division had pulled out, creating a division-long gap in his line. To 
rectify this, he ordered that Thomas Wood’s division (on Brannan’s immediate 
right) “close up” and plug the hole he believed Brannan’s division had left.76  
When Wood was read the orders, he replied that there was no gap in the 
line for his division to fill, since Brannan was still to Wood’s immediate left. The 
staff officer who delivered the order promptly replied that it was to be dismissed 
in that case. However, Wood, having been harshly criticized by Rosecrans before, 
was not keen to repeat the process. Instead, he insisted that the order be followed, 
and he pulled his division out of line to move to the left behind Brannan. Some 
report that he said to his staff: “Gentlemen, I hold the fatal order of the day in my 
hand and would not part with it for five thousand dollars.” By moving his division 
out of line, he had in effect created the very problem he had been sent to rectify, 
as there now was a gap between Brannan and the right.77 
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Unfortunately for the Cumberlanders, at this same moment, James 
Longstreet’s twenty-three-thousand-man command happened upon the huge gap 
in the Union line.78 As Longstreet’s men began to sweep away the Union right, 
Rosecrans became cut off from Thomas’ Corps by the retreating masses of 
Thomas Crittenden’s XXI Corps, so he sent an order for him to report to 
Chattanooga, believing the battle to be lost.79 In fact, Thomas’ men were putting 
up a valiant fight on Horseshoe 
Ridge and Snodgrass Hill, earning 
him the nickname “Rock of 
Chickamauga.”80  
Historians have debated for 
decades who is to blame for the 
defeat at Chickamauga, whether it be 
Rosecrans, Wood, or a disparity in 
numbers (the Army of the 
Cumberland was outnumbered 
during the battle).81 Ultimately, the man responsible for the success of the Army 
of the Cumberland was its commander, William Rosecrans. He had made several 
                                                          
78 Daniel, Days, 329. 
79 Henry M. Cist, Army of the Cumberland, (C. Scribner’s Sons, 1882), 225. 
80 Daniel, Days, 332. 
81 Daniel, Days, 329, Cist, Cumberland, 199. 
 
Longstreet’s men surge through the gap left by Wood’s division 
(Courtesy: Civil War Trust) 
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disastrous mistakes during the day, including: relying too heavily on his corps 
commanders, moving too many of his troops to Thomas’ defense, writing 
complicated and confusing orders, and failing to come to Thomas’ aid to rally the 
Cumberlanders on Horseshoe Ridge. It was this last action that was the “turning-
point” of Rosecrans’ career, and he spent the rest of his life trying to defend his 
own actions during the battle.82 
The men under his command, however, need no justification. As their 
commander failed to lead them, thousands of Cumberlanders continued to fight 
tenaciously. The 125th Ohio earned the nickname “Opdycke’s Tigers” for 
devastating Confederates in the Dyer field, while August Willich’s brigade drove 
back an entire Confederate division, an action for which it became known as the 
“Iron Brigade of the Army of the Cumberland.”83 On Horseshoe Ridge, the 21st 
Ohio held for six hours before being forced to surrender by a bizarre case of 
mistaken identity, an action Peter Cozzens has called “the most distinguished 
service rendered by any single regiment at Chickamauga.”84 Nor were these types 
of stands in the minority. In fact, the majority of the Army of the Cumberland did 
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not leave the field until 10:00 that night, nearly twelve full hours after the order 
delivered to Wood had sealed its fate.85 
It is an injustice to the men of the Army of the Cumberland that it has been 
disregarded because of its commanders. Ultimately, it was Buell’s fault for the 
fiasco of Perryville, Rosecrans’ fault for the defeat at Chickamauga, and Thomas’ 
sour relations with Grant that proved the army’s undoing, not the actions of the 
Cumberlanders themselves. Unfortunately, in Grant’s quest to paint himself as the 
only true hero of the West, he also swept aside the accomplishments of other 
Western generals, in particular the three commanders of the Army of the 
Cumberland. Unfortunately, many historians who have been heavily influenced 
by Grant have done nothing to alleviate their ongoing struggle for attention.86 The 
inability of these and other historians to separate the fates of the soldiers of the 
Army of the Cumberland from the fate of their commander displays an 
unfortunate lack of fact-checking and, therefore, historical credibility.  
Southern Romanticism 
The feud between Grant and the commanders of the Army of the 
Cumberland can be summed up in one divisive phrase: “History is written by the 
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victors.”87 However, in the case of the American Civil War, the victors have not 
been the only ones penning its history. In a similar fashion to Grant’s censorship 
of the Cumberlanders’ capabilities and exploits, some Southern historians and 
their pride for the Confederacy have deprived the Army of the Cumberland of 
receiving its due respect. This is mostly due to the mentality of some Southern-
sympathizing historians and ordinary Southerners themselves who believe in the 
so-called “Lost Cause,” which maintains that the South fought an unwinnable 
battle against an overwhelming enemy for honorable, justifiable reasons.88 To fit 
this narrative, these historians and everyday men and women have placed too 
much emphasis on their lionized hero Robert E. Lee, who fit the image of the 
admirable warrior, and not enough on his less stellar counterpart, Braxton Bragg, 
who did not. Just as the Army of the Cumberland’s fate plummeted with its 
commanders’ careers, Bragg’s Army of Tennessee has suffered the same 
indignity. This affects the Army of the Cumberland and its memory directly, as 
the Southern view of the war has always been tugged away from Bragg’s army to 
Lee’s. Unfortunately, if the focus of Southern historians is on Lee, they have little 
to say about Bragg and even less to say about his enemies, Buell, Rosecrans, 
Thomas and the Cumberlanders.  
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Robert E. Lee was the epitome of the “Southern Gentleman.” The son of 
vaunted Revolutionary War hero “Light Horse” Harry, Lee grew up in his home 
state of Virginia, serving with distinction during the Mexican War and the 
Harper’s Ferry scuffle with John Brown and his men. When the Civil War broke 
out, Lee was quickly called to Richmond and assigned a desk job by Jefferson 
Davis. However, when the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Joseph 
Johnston, was wounded at the Battle of Seven Pines on the peninsula, Lee was 
given command.89 
As commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee excelled. He turned 
back McClellan’s army from the gates of Richmond, ravaged John Pope at 
Second Manassas, and drove into Maryland, where he was turned back at the 
Battle of Antietam. Unfazed, he went on to maul Ambrose Burnside at 
Fredericksburg and whip Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, before suffering his 
greatest defeat at the hands of George Meade outside of Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania. Still, Lee persevered, stymieing Grant in the Wilderness at 
Spotsylvania and badly defeating him at Cold Harbor, before finally crumbling 
under the Siege of Petersburg. On April 9, 1865, the favorite Son of the South 
surrendered to Grant, ending the war in the Eastern Theater.90 
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Braxton Bragg was the complete opposite of Robert E. Lee. While Lee 
worked well with his subordinates, had a knack for tactical brilliance, and was the 
perfect model of the Christian general, Bragg was vitriolic, profane, and tactically 
unsuccessful. As Lee churned out success after success from Virginia, Bragg 
“snatched defeat from the jaws of victory”91 time and time again in Kentucky and 
Tennessee.   
This has led to the permeation of Lee-centered Southern revisionism that 
is prevalent and obvious to this day. A more noticeable example is the so-called 
“rebel flag.” In Southern states across the U.S., and many north of the Mason-
Dixon as well, these flags adorn gift shops, pickup trucks, tattooed limbs, and 
home windows. Yet, not only was this flag not the national flag of the 
Confederate States of America (that distinction belongs to the far less known 
Stars and Bars), but it originally flew as the battle flag of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, Lee’s army.92 Gradually, in an occurrence that would foreshadow the 
influence of future Leeism, Western armies began adopting the “Southern Cross” 
as their own battle flag.93 As a result, the most popular item of memorabilia from 
the Civil War is inextricably linked to the Virginia general, so much so that even 
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the Dodge Charger featured in the Dukes of Hazzard, emblazoned with the 
Southern Cross, became known as the “General Lee.”  
This is not the only instance in which Lee has been seared into the 
Southern conscious as the premier general of the Civil War. His name highlights 
the titles of high schools, colleges, streets, academic halls, ships, and tanks. His 
image is displayed on everything from t-shirts to paintings and sculptures, and 
even the side of Stone Mountain in Atlanta. Bragg, on the other hand, is the 
namesake of two forts and a ghost town in Texas. 
Is this oversight justified? Perhaps. Unlike the Grant/Rosecrans debacle, 
where the two generals were of equal or similar caliber, Lee and Bragg could 
hardly have been farther apart. All told, Lee’s major victories number around 
four: the Peninsula Campaign, the battles of Second Manassas (or Second Bull 
Run), Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. In addition, he was adored by his 
men, who referred to him affectionately as “Marse Robert.”94 Bragg commanded 
very little respect from his own troops, and their apathy is understandable.95 When 
it came to victories, Bragg could boast only one: the Battle of Chickamauga. 
Their defeats are similarly lopsided. Lee arguably lost two battles: Antietam 
(disputed) and Gettysburg. Bragg, conversely, was defeated in the battles of 
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Perryville (though only strategically); Stones River, during the Tullahoma 
Campaign; and the battles for Chattanooga. 
One look at Bragg’s battle record is enough for any champion of the Lost 
Cause to wince. The Lost Cause is dependent on the idea that the South fought 
valiantly against insurmountable odds, an idea that has its roots, and indeed its 
entire existence, in the battle prowess of Robert E. Lee.96 Any possibility that runs 
contrary to this idea must then either be ignored entirely or acknowledged only 
grudgingly and fleetingly. Therefore, because Bragg’s and the Army of 
Tennessee’s existence is a perplexing enigma that is easier to ignore than explain, 
many Southern historians have chosen the former.  
Are these historians at fault? Not necessarily. Ignorance may be bliss, but 
it is not always chosen. Because many of the initial histories of the war that “Lost 
Cause” enthusiasts fashioned do not dwell on Bragg’s army, many subsequent 
historians, who base their own writings on the work of their predecessors, may 
simply not know much of Bragg’s existence, thus skewing their uninformed 
opinions towards the Lost Cause idea that the South had better generals who put 
up a good fight against unbeatable foes. 
This is an idea that must be put to rest if the Army of the Cumberland is 
ever going to be remembered correctly. While it is true that before the Battle of 
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Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac suffered many defeats and won few 
victories, the exact opposite was true for the Army of the Cumberland. From the 
outset of the war, the men who became Cumberlanders were winning more than 
they were losing. They won the battles of Mill Springs and Shiloh, drove the 
Confederates out of Kentucky and deep into Tennessee, won again at Stones 
River, and drove the Confederates again, this time back to Chattanooga. By the 
time the Army of the Potomac had finally had its first taste of real victory at the 
so-called “turning point” of the war, Gettysburg, the Army of the Cumberland had 
defeated the Confederates three times tactically, twice strategically, and stood on 
the doorstep to the key railroad hub of Chattanooga.  
It is facts like these that led the late renowned Civil War historian Shelby 
Foote, a Southerner himself, to say, “I don’t think the South ever had a chance to 
win [the] war.”97 This statement is consistent with Lost Cause ideology which 
hinges on the belief that the South faced an impossible foe. More importantly, 
Lost Cause historians place great importance on Robert E. Lee’s seeming ability 
to conquer a military goliath in the Union. However, if one studies the war from 
an objective viewpoint, it becomes clear that the feats of Western armies like the 
Army of the Cumberland dampen the importance of Lee’s successes in the 
Eastern Theater. While this may in some ways contribute to the idea that the 
                                                          
97 Shelby Foote, quoted in The Civil War (videorecording) (United States: PBS Home Video, 
2011). 
35
Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood
Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2018
 
 
South never had a chance at victory, it also downplays Lee’s importance, as the 
other Southern armies were consistently defeated by their Western enemies. 
 Unfortunately for the men in those armies, the eyes of the public had 
always rested on the Army of the Potomac, as they still do in the fundamental 
understanding of the war today. The Eastern Theater, often considered the 
essential, main history of the war, is the worst example of Union success prior to 
1863, yet it remains to be seen that way because of the focus on Robert E. Lee 
and the Army of Northern Virginia.  
Finding a Balance 
This work is not meant to be an indictment of any historians who have not 
focused their research and writings on the Army of the Cumberland, nor is it a 
condemnation of the noble soldiers those historians have chosen to focus on; 
those men have earned their right place in history as heroes of the Union. Instead, 
it is a call to arms, or the shining of a light on soldiers who have also earned their 
place but have not yet received it. It is a plea for historians to see the 
Cumberlanders for their true value and an encouragement to do what historians do 
best: bring new studies and interpretations to the table. 
The Army of the Cumberland is one of the most important armies in 
American history. For three long years, it slugged its way through the wilderness 
of Eastern Tennessee and Northern Georgia: crossing rivers, navigating forests, 
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and climbing mountains, covering an expanse five times greater than that covered 
by the Army of the Potomac and with far fewer men.98 It was the only Union 
army during the war to destroy an enemy army, which it did thoroughly under 
Thomas at the Battle of Nashville.99 Indeed, many of the men who had called 
themselves Cumberlanders found themselves marching through Georgia with 
Sherman in 1864.100 Those men—who went into battle at Shiloh, Perryville, 
Stones River, Tullahoma, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Franklin, and Nashville—
should be considered of equal value with those who did so at Bull Run, the 
Peninsula, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and 
Petersburg. The blood they spilled was the same: Northern, Union blood. They 
fought for the same country, under the same flag, for the same reasons. Those 
men, and their leaders, deserve to have their stories told just as much as their 
Eastern comrades. They have earned their place in history as heroes of the Union. 
A well-rounded interpretation of the Civil War encapsulates both theaters 
of war and all the major armies therein. It does not favor one army over the other, 
one theater over the other, nor does it favor the Confederacy over the Union, 
Grant over Rosecrans, or Lee over Bragg. One of the chief goals of all historians 
is to present all available information on a subject in an objective, informative 
                                                          
98 Daniel, Days, xiii. 
99 Daniel, Days, 433. 
100 Daniel, Days, 430. 
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matter. However, it would be a disservice if an historian whose passion was for 
Gettysburg was to be dismayed at the high number of books on the subject and 
decided not to write. Likewise, if a historian was eager to write about the Battle of 
Stones River, it would be unfortunate if he became distraught with the seemingly 
low level of interest and information on the subject and came to the same 
conclusion. Thus, if any person is interested in a particular subject, that is the 
subject they ought to research and write about.  
Therein lies the purposes of this work: to generate interest and focus 
attention. There is no shortage of interest or attention for the Army of the 
Potomac or the Eastern Theater of the Civil War. The men who served in that 
army have received their due share of glory. The Cumberlanders, as of yet, have 
not. Hence, if while scanning these pages, any reader has been intrigued by the 
Army of the Cumberland, by the battles of Shiloh, Stones River or Tullahoma, by 
Buell, Rosecrans or Thomas, by the men in the ranks themselves, or by the 
Western Theater in general, and that reader decides to devote his research on 
those subjects, then this work has been a success. It is hoped that by bringing this 
subject to light, others will be inspired to put effort into interpreting the stories of 
the Cumberlanders from different points of view, so as to cover all possible 
interpretations and thus gain a better understanding of the truth. It is this truth that 
all historians are meant to pursue, and it would truly be a tragedy if the Army of 
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the Cumberland continues to be overshadowed in Civil War history simply 
because its story is not written in letters of blood. 
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